The international payments system and farm exports by Darryl R. Francis
IT IS GOOD to have this opportunity to discuss
with you some vital issues of international trade. Each
of us has an interest in this subject — some as pro-
ducers of goods which compete with imports, others
as producers who export part of their output, and all
as consumers who gain from the efficiencies of inter-
national specialization of labor and resource use.
First, I shall briefly review some historical develop-
ments in our international payments system. Then, I
shall discuss certain policy actions that have been
taken to increase foreign trade and, finally, basic fac-
tors which tend to limit foreign trade expansion.
Earlier Payments System — Self-Adjusting
In the half century prior to World War 1, the
Western World had a self-equilibrating system of
settling international accounts. Most commercial na-
tions \vere on the gold standard with the domestic
stock of money tied to the stock of gold. A balance-
of-payments deficit led to a gold outflo\v which, in
turn, led to a reduction in the nation’s money stock,
A decline in the stock of money reduced domestic
demand for goods and services, thereby discouraging
imports and encouraging exports. This process con-
tinued until the balance-of-payments deficit was
eliminated,
With the monetary disruptions during the war,
most nations left the gold standard. In the 1920’s, at-
tempts were made to restore the system, but the rela-
tionships established between currencies and gold
were often set at the pre-war rates, and some im-
portant currencies were overvalued. In those countries
with overvalued currencies, imports were stimulated
and exports declined, thereby depressing their econo-
mies. Attempts were made to make the necessary ad-
justments, but the depression of the 1930’s dealt a
death blow to the gold standard before new equilib-
rium rates could be restored.
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Losing gold in a period of growing unemployment
like the 193O’s meant further contraction of national
money stocks and further deflation, Most nations con-
sequently broke the link between gold and domestic
money, being unwilling to let international gold move-
ments influence the domestic money stock and in-
comne. Following the breakdown of the gold standard,
most nations moved to a gold exchange system in
which national currency values were arbitrarily peg-
ged to the dollar and the dollar pegged to gold.
Current System Not Self-Adjusting
The gold exchange system automatically permitted
free currency convertability among participating
countries. Under the present system, funds flowing
out of a country reduce its international reserves
just as under the gold standard in former years. Now,
however, these flows can be offset by central bank
actions, and they have no automatic innpact on do-
mestic money, prices, and income. Actions can be
taken by central bankers to reduce the stock of money
and the demand for goods and services and put a
brake on domestic prices when international reserve
outflows occur, hut such actions now reflect conscious
policy rather than the automatic operation of the sys-
temn. Because of these destabilizing effects on domestic
income and prices, such actions are taken with at-
tremne caution, We are thus at times torn between
actions for implementing balance-of-payments objec-
tives and actions for optimum domestic conditions,
A few nations have altered their exchange rates
when large excesses or shortages developed in their
foreign exchange accounts. The United Kingdom re-
duced the value of the pound as a result of a large
and continuous deficit, while Germany increased the
value of its currency following a large and continuous
surplus. This method of changing the terms of trade
has not proven a practical solution to the United
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States, as the dollar is a key international reserve cur-
rency \videly held for official balances, Any reduction
in its value in terms of gold would result in an im-
mediate loss to all foreign dollar holders.
Other methods used to maintain a balance-of-pay-
ments surplus include tariffs, import quotas, capital
export controls, and foreign travel n~strictions,Each
of these methods, however, tends to reduce the vol-
ume of international trade. In most instances, they
are arbitrary and subject to extreme abuse by the
enforcing agencies.
The special dra\ving rights (SDRs) activated by
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) early this
year extended the period over which an imbalance
of international payments can occur. These rights es-
sentially increase the quantity of international money
by a regulated amount of SDRs each year, with the
IMF acting as a clearing agent. Although serving to
ease the problem of short-run payment imbalances,
SDRs do nothing to alter the terms of trade or re-
verse basic imbalances. Terms of trade between two
nations are altered in the mnarket by changes in na-
tional price levels and exchange rates. The SDRs
permit more time for a nation to take actions to alter
the termns of trade and are beneficial in this respect.
Nevertheless, if basic steps are not taken to equilib-
rate the terms of trade, an imbalance of international
payments on the basis of fixed exchange rates cannot
persist indefinitely without total loss of foreign ex-
change holdings.
Recent U. S. Experience
With this background, let us briefly review the U. S.
situation with reference to the balance of payments
and holdings of foreign exchange. Following World
‘War II, this country had a gold balance of $24 billion,
or about two-thirds of the free world’s stock of gold.
We were likewise endowed with a large portion of
the free world’s productive capacity. Justifiably, do-
inestic policies were instituted to provide other na-
tions of the free \vorld with a better balance in foreign
exchange. We generally maintained expansive snone-
tary and fiscal policies antI engaged in massive for-
eign aid programs, which tended to reduce U. S. gold
stocks. By early 1968 our gold stock had declined to
$10.7 billion, only slightly more than one-fourth of the
world’s total. Our gold holdings have since increased
slightly, hut the basic factors underlying our balance-
of-payments position have not improved.
Our needs for foreign exchange, like an individ-
ual’s needs for cash balances, depend upon the vol-
umne of transactions to be settled and the synchroniza-
tion of receipts and payments. Since international
trade by the United States accounts for only about
one-sixth of the world’s total, we apparently do not
need two-thirds of the free world’s stock of gold pos-
sessed twenty years ago. Yet, in view of the volume
of our international transactions and the foreign
claims held on the United States, we do need a siz-
able stock of gold. Most importantly, however, we
require means for altering the balance of payments to
avoid further loss of liquidity. To alleviate this prob-
lemn, I would suggest greater flexibility in setting ex-
change rates between the dollar and other currencies,
A system of “crawling” exchange rates, whereby the
rates are permitted to change a small amount each
week or month toward new market levels when fin-
balances occur, would be a major improvement over
the current system. By altering rates to meet payment
imbalances, the monetary authorities can concentrate
on the appropriate actions for domestic stabilization.
Protection — The Major Trade Restraint
Although the international payments system has
imperfections, it probably is not the major factor
tending to retard trade growth. Policies designed to
protect domestic producers from foreign competition
have probably been a more important restraint to
foreign trade. All commercial nations pursue protec-
tionist policies which reduce the quantity of goods
and services available to consumers, and we are
equally guilty of this practice. When the nation was
young, it levied tariffs for income in preference to
domestic taxes. Later, tariffs were raised to protect
our so-called infant industries from foreign comnpeti-
tion. The protectionist argument still prevails in one
form or another. Between 1865 and 1935 our average
rate on dutiable imports never fell belo\v 39 per cent,
except for the period during and immediately follow-
ing the First World \-Var when other nations had a
very small output of civilian goods for export.tm The
Underwood Law in 1914 imposed an average rate of
29 per cent on dutiable imports, which was raised to
39 per cent in 1923 under the Fordney-McUmber Law
and further increased to 53 per cent in 1930 under
the Hawley—Smoot Law.
Since the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934,
the nation has pursued an announced policy of “free.
ing” international trade. Numerous tariff reductions
have been negotiated. Nevertheless, duties have of-
t
Don D. I-Iumphrey, American Import-s (New York: The
Twentieth Century Fund, 1955), p. 74.
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ten remained so high and other restrictions so effec-
tive that foreign trade has not been greatly freed.
Protection Through Nontariff Barriers
While tariffshave traditionally been the chief means
of protecting domestic producers from foreign com-
petition, other protective devices have increasingly
been used in recent years. Cluef among them are
import quotas; domestic subsidies; bilateral trade
agreements; import licensing; domnestic monopolies
operating under governmental authority; and “volun-
tary” controls, such as the case of cotton textiles. In
some instances, the restrictions have involved special
legislation. In others, informal agreements have been
sufficient to limit trade to arbitrarily detennined lev-
els. With the aid of one or more of these measures,
nations can maintain tariff duties at relatively mod-
erate levels and still protect producers from foreign
competition. This change in method of protection
provides an opportunity for great obscurity in discuss-
ing trade policies and results of tariff reduction agree-
ments. A reduction in tariff rates may have little
meaning, since real barriers to trade often remain
unchanged.
International trade barriers are as unreasonable un-
der competitive production and mnarketiug conditions
as are trade barriers between states, cities, or coun-
ties. To the extent that they reduce the volume of
goods and services traded, they reduce welfare.
Our country has not been innocent with respect to
the use of these protective devices. Even in agricul-
ture, which has such a large stake in free trade, we
have established highly protectionist policies. We
have sugar import quotas which, based on the New
York wholesale price, cost U. S. consumers an addi-
tional 4 cents for each one pound of sugar pur-
chased.2 We have subscribed to international trade
agreements which set mninimum prices on coffee and
wheat, thereby limniting trade in these commodities.
We have meat import quotas which provide limits on
imports of beef. Our cotton export subsidy, designed
to offset the trade-retarding features of our domestic
price support program, is sufficient to pennit exports
of cotton to Japan and imports of goods made from
the cotton to the U.S. for sale in competition with our
own mills. In order to avoid excessive disruptions
from such competition, however, we have a tacit
a~eement with the Japanese to limit cotton goods
exports to the United States. Such tacit arrangements
tm
lnternatioaal Monetary Fund, International Financial Sta-
tic-tics, Sept. 1970, p. 29.
are apparently’ preferred over formalized legal actions,
but, if they are equally effective in reducing trade,
they are likewise equally effective in reducing welfare.
Domestic Subsidies Restrictive
Also important in limiting foreign trade are produc-
tion controls and subsidies. For a number of years,
the British have subsidized their farm production,
maintaining excessive labor in agriculture which, in
effect, limits their imports and our exports of farm
products to them, These workers could produce more
real income in nonfarm pursuits, and, under free
trade conditions, the British would export more uon-
farm products and import more fann products, thereby
enhancing their total production and welfare.
Our own domestic farm programs inhibit world
trade. Despite an announced policy of free trade
since 1934 and lower tariff rates, our domestic farm
policies have probably offset the advantages gained
from the reduced tariff levies. Farm production con-
trol and price support programs were initiated in the
mnid-1930’s which contributed to higher fann produc-
tion cost and higher prices for farmn products both
here and abroad. Our farni products became less
competitive in the world market. Worse, from a long-
range view, our policy- of arbitrary farm product pric-
ing at higher than free market levels led to a loss of
confidence in the United States as a long-run source
of farm products. This move from competitive to ar-
bitrary pricing indicated to our customers abroad that
hereafter prices of U.S. farm commodities would he
in excess of free market prices. Higher export prices
in turn indicated higher food and fiber costs to fin-
porting nations. Their costs of imported food thus
hinge on the decisions of our price-making authorities,
who are likely to be more influenced by political pres-
sures at home than by living costs elsewhere.
International Trade Impeded
Our tariff reduction policies have not led to mnore
trade relative to total output. In the 1920-34 period,
prior to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, U.S.
commodity exports averaged 5.1 per cent and im-
ports 4.1 per cent of gross national product (Table 1).
In contrast, since the announced liberal trade policies
in the mid-1930’s, total exports have averaged only
4.1 per cent and imports only 2,9 per cent of GNP.
The proportion of foreign trade in fann products de-
clined even more sharply than the total. Commercial
farm exports declined from 17.4 per cent of farm out-
put in the 1920-34 period to 8.6 per cent since 1934,
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Restrictive Arguments Fallacious
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Thus, despite our announced freer trade policies,
our new harriers to international trade have offset our
trade—freeing actions, The trade barriers arc usually
imposed in such a ivay as to inhibit trade growth
rather than have a strong immediate impact, and thus
become successively mnore restrictive over time.
It is my conclusion that the predominent political
forces in most nations toclay do not really want large
increases in foreign trade, Large gains in trade upset
mnarkets’and cause changes in 1-esouree use. Some
hardships occur in the short run in the relatively less
efficient industries, Gains occur immediately, how-
ever, in the relatively’ more efficient industries and
among all consumer groups. In the longer rnn, all
groups gain from the greater efficiency of interna-
tional specialization. But, neither this nation nor other
nations have to date indicated a willingness to adopt
policies that n-ill assure these major gains at the ex-
pense of minor adjustments among some producer
groups.
Despite the fact that international welfare could
be greatly’ enhanced through freer trade practices,
the arguments of trade restrictive proponents have
been predominent in determining public policies
among leading commercial nations during the last
half century. Reasons given for import restrictions are
as follows:
I.. Large imports of farm products lower domestic
prices anti farm incomnes;
2. It is unfair to domestic labor to compete ivith
producers under “sweatshop” conditions abroad;
3. Imports are not a reliable source of vital prod-
ucts, such as food and critical defense items;
and
4. Excessive imports damage vital defense indus-
tries which are necessary for survival.3
Implicit in each of these arguments are the beliefs
that import restrictions aid certain producer groups,
or that some industries are so vital to national survival
that we cannot afford to take the risk of relying on
imports exclusively for such products.
The argument that import restrictions aid some pro-
ducer groups is true only in the short rnn. Over the
longer rnn, labor and other resources adjust to new
supply and demnand conditions, and real. gains accrne
to all groups. Furthermore, even in the short run such
restrictions are at the expense of the rest of the nation.
Let us take agriculture as an example and consider
the impact of greater exports of American farm prod-
ucts to Western Europe. Such exports will first cause
a reduction in prices to European farmers and a re-
duetion in food costs to European consumers. Their
farm incomes wili decline, providing incentive for
farm w’ork-ers to seek higher paying jobs in the non—
farm sector. The larger nonfarm labor force, which is
relatively more efficient, will achieve greater output
of nonfarm goods amId services, and exports of these
products to the United States will increase, Greater
efficiencies will occur in both their farm and nonfarm
sectors, and a larger volume of all products will be
available at lower prices, enhancing real incomes and
welfare. On the American scene, the larger volume of
fann exports will tend to increase domestic farm
prices and incomes. This ~vill attract new resources
into agrieultnre from other sectors or, more likely, re-
duce the outflow of resources from agriculture. The
larger imports of nonfarm products by the United
States will reduce demand for resources in our non-
‘I-Iumnphrey, Chapter 7.
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farm sector, but, similar to the European case, the
increased efficiencies will provide more goods and
services to our people.
The argument that imports from low-cost factories
abroad are unfair to labor is similar to the farm im-
port argument. Import restrictions aid workers in im-
port-competing industries in the short run, but injure
workers in export industries. But, once workers and
other resources have adjusted to the new market
forces, greater output is achieved and the benefits of
greater production efficiency accrue to all.
Almost all major countries subscribe to the “vital-
industries” argument for protection. Certain industries
are assumed to be vital for national survival. England,
for example, has in the past attempted to maintain
domestic food production at about 50 per cent of do-
mestic usage. These policies originated from a lack of
confidence in supplies from abroad at critical periods,
such as during wartime blockades. Many other na-
tions, including our own, prefer to maintain sufficient
resources in vital lines of production to provide a
minimum level of output in case of loss of supplies
from abroad. Oil and sugar quotas here are an exam-
ple of such protection. Nations are willing to maintain
production of these vital products, despite the fact
that such inefficient use of resources is a waste of ef-
fort. Protection for these industries against competi-
tion from abthad maintains stability of employment
for a few at the expense of many. Nations are willing
to tax more for defense items and pay higher prices
for the civilian output of such industries in order to
maintain thcse industries, despite the fact that meth-
ods of modern warfare have made such excuses obso-
lete. Nations now have the power to destroy one
another long before supplies of such critical products
are depleted. The solution lies in increased confidence
that world trade channels will remain open and sup-
ply sources unimpaired.
From the standpoint of U.S. agriculture, we look
abroad at the rapid growth of Western European na-
tions and see great opportunities for farm commodity
exports, provided these nations \vill Only open their
trade doors and invite us in. It is my conclusion that
we have not earned the invitation. Despite our num-
erous pronouncements, our policies have not con-
tributed to two-way trade arrangements. We have
done little to merit the dependence by Western Euro-
pean nations upon us for an indefinite source of vital
products at competitive prices. We have followed
neither tariff, quota, or other import regulatory poli-
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cies nor domestic pricing policies that are conducive
to free trade.
Although the arguments are overxvhelming in favor
of more trade between nations, Ia mquite pessimistic
as to its future course. Forces tending to reduce wel-
fare through trade barriers are better financed and
more powerful than the forces active in promoting
welfare through freeing trade channels, As an indica-
tion of the power of protective groups, about 590
import quota proposals were introduced in the recent
session of Congress prior to the end of August.4 One
bill, approved by the House Ways and Means Com-
mnittee, was described by the New York Times as the
“most protectionist and reactionary trade legislation
in forty years.”5 Signs admonishing us to purchase
American goods and protect American jobs can be
observed daily. Only the textbooks, however, are
available to point out the gains from free trade, and
few professors are reporting the story to the general
public.
Summary
In summary, our international payments system has
imperfections. It is not self-equilibrating as it was
under the gold standard prior to World War I. It has
not, however, been the major factor tending to retard
foreign trade growth. This growth has been retarded
because neither the political forces in this nation nor
other nations are willing to forego the short-run in-
terests of a few producer groups for the general wel-
fare of the nation.
There are feiv who deny the gains from greater
exports, but powerful groups fear a rise in imports.
Both exports and imports enhance total welfare. The
removal of trade restrictions would be especially
beneficial to American agriculture. We have a major
relative advantage in the production of fann com-
mnodites. Under free world trade policies and free
domestic producing conditions, world-wide food prices
could be lowered and world diets improved. The Re-
ciprocal Trade Agreements Act, the recent Kennedy
Round, and numerous other acts were designed to
achieve these objectives. Proposed modern liberal
policies, however, are often followed by restrictive
actions more typical of the mnercantiist ages. In prac-
tice we still follow the obsolete theories of several
centuries ago.
Most of the arguments used against free trade
practice are not applicable to modern world condi-
~International Commerce, Sept. 7, 1970, p. 10.
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tions. The implied disrnptions in local industries are
generally overstated and are often excuses for main-
taining resources in inefficient lines of production.
Current unemployment insurance and labor retrain-
ing social programs minimize hardships to the labor
force resulting from the change. Little capital loss
would likely occur, as our heavily capitalized indus-
tries are better able to compete in the world market
due to technological change. The vital-industries argu-
ment is no longer applicable, since, in case of all-out
war under modern conditions, no industry is secure
regardless of where it is located.
The United States should take the lead in dropping
all trade barriers. Tariffs are not the only itemn to
consider, We should move immnediately to build world
confidence in us as a supplier and market, Real ac-
complishments will require more than the rhetoric of
recent decades followed by high level conferences,
which tend to free trade where no potential trade
exists. We must be willing to remove barriers, permit
major increases in imports, and oppose the power of
producer groups who have made their short-run in-
terest paramnount to the welfare of the nation. We
must he willing to dismantle our inefficient produc-
tion controls in agriculture and assure foreign con-
sumers that our farm products will be available at
competitive prices. A move toward free trade is a
move toward less Govenunent control of prices and
production and greater reliance on mnarket forces for
resource adjustment.
These moves are counter to the great surge to al-
leviate 211 individual hardships through general legis-
lation which temporarily aids the few but reduces
national welfare. Their adoption can reverse the trend
to isolationism in the current century and greatly en-
hance the welfare of both our own citizens and those
of the rest of the world.
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